: Courting high-influence users (like "anchor tenants" in a mall) to draw in others.
Your strategy has three parts:
However, a counter-movement is rising: Critics argue that today's matchmakers (Uber, Airbnb) are rent-seeking toll collectors that own the reputation and identity of the user. The next wave proposes decentralized protocols where the "platform" is just code, and users own their data. The matchmaker becomes a public utility, not a private monopoly. Matchmakers- The New Economics Of Multisided Platforms
| Side | Demand Elasticity | Cross-Side Effect (+/-) | Pricing Role | | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | | Side A | High (price sensitive) | Strong positive to B | Subsidy (low/negative price) | | Side B | Low (less sensitive) | Weak positive to A | Money (high price) | : Courting high-influence users (like "anchor tenants" in
Despite their potential for massive scale, most matchmakers fail. The authors point out that these businesses are incredibly "brittle" in their early stages. Common pitfalls include: The matchmaker becomes a public utility, not a